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Abstract. Public-key distance bounding schemes are needed to defeat
relay attacks in payment systems. So far, only ve such schemes exist,
but fail to fully protect against malicious provers. In this paper, we solve
this problem. We provide a full formalism to dene the proof of prox-
imity of knowledge (PoPoK). Protocols should succeed if and only if a
prover holding a secret is within the proximity of the verier. Like proofs
of knowledge, these protocols must satisfy completeness, soundness (pro-
tection for the honest verier), and security (protection for the honest
prover). We construct ProProx, the very rst sound PoPoK.
1 Introduction
Relay attacks can be a serious threat against applications such as NFC-based
payment: for small payments, there is typically no action required on the cred-
itcard or smartphone (beyond approaching to the terminal) such as typing a
PIN code. So, a man-in-the-middle adversary could just relay communications
between the payment device of the victim and the terminal to make payments
on the behalf of the holder. The limit of the speed of communication was pro-
posed to solve this problem [4]. Brands and Chaum [11] introduced the notion
of distance-bounding protocol to prove that a prover is close enough to a verier.
This relies on information being local and unable to travel faster than the speed
of light. So, an RFID reader can identify when participants are close enough
because the round-trip communication time in challenge/response rounds have
been small enough.
The literature considers several threat models.
{ Relay attack : an adversary relay messages between a far-away honest prover
and a verier, trying to make the verier accept. This is extended by Maa
fraud [15] where the adversary can also modify messages. This is further
extended by Man-in-the-Middle attack [6,8,9] where the attack follows a
learning phase where the prover could be close-by. In Impersonation fraud [2],
the prover is absent and the adversary tries to impersonate the prover to the
verier. These threat models have in common that the prover is honest.
{ Distance fraud [11]: a far-away malicious prover tries to pass the protocol.
{ Terrorist fraud [15]: a far-away malicious prover, with the help of an ad-
versary, tries to make the verier accept, but without giving the adversary
any advantage to later pass the protocol alone. This extends to Collusion
fraud [6,8,9] where the goal of the adversary is to run a man-in-the-middle
attack. Terrorist fraud is also related to the notion of soundness [25]: when-
ever the verier accepts, there must be an extractor who can reconstruct
the secret of the prover based on the view of all close-by participants, pos-
sibly after several iterations. An hybrid model between distance fraud and
terrorist fraud is the one of Distance hijacking [14]: A far-away prover takes
advantage of some honest, active provers to make the verier accept.
One of the rst models to capture these notions was proposed by Avoine et al. [1].
However, it was not formal enough. Then, two parallel models were developed:
the BMV model [6,8,9] and the DFKO model [16]. There exist many symmetric
distance-bounding protocols but so far only the SKI protocol [5,6,7,9] (based on
the BMV model), the Fischlin-Onete (FO) protocol [18] (based on the DFKO
model), and DB1, DB2, and their extensions [10,24] (combining both SKI and
FO in the BMV model) provide an all-encompassing proven security.
Public-key distance bounding. In interactive proofs, the prover does not share
a secret key with the verier. The verier only knows a public key. However,
so far, only the following distance-bounding protocols are in the public key
model: the Brands-Chaum protocol [11], the Bussard-Bagga protocol [12], the
Hermans-Peeters-Onete (HPO) protocol [22]1, and PrivDB [26]. The Bussard-
Bagga protocol was broken by Bay et al. [3] and none of the others protect
against terrorist fraud. Additionally, the protocol VSSDB was presented at the
BalkanCryptSec'14 conference by Gambs et al. It is based on the random oracle
model, but the instanciability is questionable, as it requires a NIZK proof on
statements of form fx : c = f(x;H(x))g where H is a random oracle. As far as
we know, this does not exist. So, the problem of making a fully secure public-key
distance-bounding protocol is still open.
In Table 1 we update the list from [26] with all known public-key distance
bounding protocols and the proven status of their security with respect to Man-
in-the-Middle (MiM), Distance Fraud (DF), Distance Hijacking (DH), Collusion
Fraud (CF), Privacy, and Strong privacy.
Contribution. In clear, our contributions in this paper are as follows.
{ We adapt the framework of [10] in the BMV model to provide a full formal-
ization of public-key distance-bounding. We specify our new primitive: the
proof of proximity of knowledge (PoPoK).
{ We change the denition of soundness from [10] and [25] to make it closer
to the one of interactive proofs. So, our model is pretty natural and nicely
connects recent work on distance bounding (such as the BMV model [6,8,9])
and interactive proofs.
{ We construct ProProx, the very rst sound PoPoK. It is based on the
quadratic residuosity problem, using the Goldwasser-Micali encryption [20,21]
1 A variant of the HPO protocol oers anonymous authentication [19].
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Table 1. Existing Public-Key Distance Bounding Protocols
protocol MiM DF DH CF Privacy Strong privacy
Brands-Chaum [11] secure secure insecure insecure insecure insecure
DBPK-Log [12] insecure insecure insecure insecure
HPO [22] secure secure insecure secure insecure
GOR [19] secure secure insecure insecure insecure insecure
privDB [26] secure secure secure insecure secure secure
ProProx (this paper) secure secure secure secure insecure insecure
eProProx [27] secure secure secure secure secure secure
as a homomorphic perfectly binding commitment Com(b; ) and the Fiat-
Shamir protocol [17]. We also use a function H which is assumed to be such
that x 7! (Com(b1;H(x; 1)); : : : ;Com(bn;H(x; n))) is a one-way function,
where x = (b1; : : : ; bn). (An easy instance is when H is a random oracle.)
{ We provide a technique to prove security and soundness. Essentially, we
construct a straightline extractor based on the \Fundamental Lemma" and
prove that the protocol is zero-knowledge.
2 Model and Denitions
We rene the security denitions and other tools from the BMV model [6,8,9,25].
Constructions depend on some security parameter  which is omitted for more
readability. A constant does not depend on , while parameters dening cryp-
tographic constructions do. Algorithms run in probabilistic polynomial-time
(PPT) in terms of . A real function f() is negligible if for any d, we have
f() = O( d), as ! +1. We denote f() = negl(). We also dene
Tail(n; ; ) =
nX
i=
n
i

i(1  )n i
2.1 Computational, Communication, and Adversarial Models
In our settings, participants are interactive Turing machines running PPT algo-
rithms. We follow the BMV model [6,8,9]: we assume that participants have a
location which is an element of a metric space S, with a distance function d. If
a participant 1 at a location loc1 executes a special command send(2;m) at
time t to send a message m to a participant 2 at location loc2, the message m
is received by 2 at time t + d(loc1; loc2). Furthermore, any malicious partici-
pant 3 at some location loc3 could see this message m at time t+ d(loc1; loc3).
We assume no authentication: 2 does not know if the message really comes
from 1. There is however an exception preventing m from being delivered to
2: if 2 is honest and some (malicious) participant 3 at some location loc3
has sent a special signal corrupt(1; 2) at time t
0, m is not delivered to 2 if
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t+d(loc1; loc2)  t0+d(loc3; loc2). This condition is a consequence of the informa-
tion traveling with a speed limit: whenever a malicious participant 3 corrupts a
1 ! 2 channel, 2 will only receive the messages from 1 until his corruption
signal emitted from 3 reaches 2.
Note that once the 1 ! 2 channel is corrupted, 3 can still see the message
m sent by 1 and decide to send any m
0 to 2, either depending on m if he waits
to receive m, or not. The crux is that either m0 is independent of m, or it is
delivered at a later time, when d(loc1; loc2) < d(loc1; loc3) + d(loc3; loc2).
The communication model is only used to prove the \Fundamental Lemma".
We take here a version of it inspired from [24].
Lemma 1 (Fundamental Lemma). Assume a multiparty protocol execution
with a distinguished participant V, the set Far of all participants within a distance
to V larger than B, and the set Close of all other participants. At some time t
in the execution, V broadcasts a random challenge c based on some fresh coins
and waits for a response r for up to 2B time. (If no answer is received, we set
r = ?.) We let expc be the experiment in which the challenge is equal to c. For
each instance U , we denote by ViewU his initial view. For U 6= V, this is common
to all expc. We further denote by Incoming
c
U (E) the list of all incoming messages
seen by U until time t+2B  d(V; U) in expc and coming from an instance in a
set E. Finally, OutgoingV denotes all messages sent by V before time t. This is
common to all expc. There exists an algorithm Algo such that for all c and c0,
we have in expc that
r = Algo

c; (ViewU )U2Close ; (Incoming
c0
U (Far))U2Close[fVg ;OutgoingV

If Close is empty, we can further write r = Algo (Incomingc0V (Far)).
To make the lemma short: r cannot depend on any message which was sent from
a far away U after receiving c. So, if we simulate expc0 in a straightline way, we
can compute for each c what would have been r if c was sent instead of c0.
We provide below a detailed proof of this lemma in the BMV model.
Proof. We rst show that there exists an algorithm such that for all c,
r = Algo

c; (ViewU )U2Close ; (Incoming
c
U (Far))U2Close[fVg ;OutgoingV

Indeed, we show below that for each U 2 Close we can compute the view of U at
time t+2B d(V; U). Then, we can see if U sends a message r to V. We can also
see in IncomingcV(Far) if there is a message r coming from far away. We can then
compute the rst of these messages which arrives to V. We note that if r comes
from some U 2 Close, then it must have been sent no later than t+2B d(V; U).
So, it must be among the computed messages.
Then, we show that for all U 2 Close [ fVg, IncomingcU (Far) is independent
from c, so we can replace c by c0. Indeed, every message w in Incoming
c
U (Far) is
seen by some U 2 Close[fVg at time t0  t+2B d(V; U) and comes from some
U 0 2 Far. So, it must have been sent at time t0   d(U;U 0)  t+ 2B   d(V; U) 
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d(U;U 0)  t + 2B   d(V; U 0)  t + B. We dene exp0 like in expc, except that
each participant U 00 is stopped at time t+B   d(U 0; U 00). In exp0, V is stopped
before time t, so c is not used. We show by induction that for each U 00, the view
of U 00 at the stopping time of U 00 is the same in expc and exp
0. We deduce that
w is independent from c0.
What remains to be shown is that for each U 2 Close we can compute the
view of U at time t + 2B   d(V; U). This is shown by induction on the time.
Indeed, this view is composed of the initial view ViewU of U and of the incoming
messages. These messages either come from V, so are either c or something in
OutgoingV , or come from U
0 2 Close, so can have been computed in the view of
U 0, by induction, or come from U 0 2 Far, so is in IncomingU . ut
Participants can move, but not faster than communication. For simplicity, we
assume that far-away participants (as dened in Def. 3) remain far away during
the entire execution. Honest participants move as instructed by the adversary.
We sometimes consider that when an honest participant receives a message
from another honest participant, it may be subject to noise. As for malicious par-
ticipants, we could assume that they use a better equipment which eliminates
noise. Also: whenever the honest-to-honest communication is not time-sensitive,
we may also assume that they use error correction means so that the communi-
cation is noiseless.
2.2 PoPoK: Proofs of Proximity of Knowledge
Denition 2 (Proof of proximity of knowledge). A proof of proximity of
knowledge (PoPoK) is a tuple (K;Kgen; P; V;B), consisting of: a key space K
depending on a security parameter , with elements of polynomially-bounded size
in terms of ; a PPT algorithm Kgen; a two-party PPT protocol (P (sk); V (pk)),
where P (sk) is the proving algorithm and V (pk) is the verifying algorithm; a
distance bound B. The algorithm Kgen maps the secret sk 2 K to a public key
pk. pk is given as input to all participants. At the end of the protocol, V (pk)
sends a nal message OutV . He accepts (OutV = 1) or rejects (OutV = 0).
The protocol must be such that when running P (sk) and V (pk) at locations
within a distance up to B, in a noiseless environment, the verier always accepts.
This property is called completeness.
If the protocol species a list of time-critical challenge/response exchanges,
we say that it is complete with noise probability pnoise if, in an environment in
which all challenge/response rounds are independently corrupted with probability
pnoise and other exchanges are not subject to noise, the probability that the verier
accepts is 1  negl().
In practice, if we want to have B = 10m, assuming that an adversary can do
computation in negligible time, the timer for receiving a response r to a challenge
c in Lemma 1 should be limited to 67ns. So, an honest prover at a zero distance
must respond within less than 67ns. This clearly excludes any cryptographic
computation. To be realistic, a PoPoK can only consider boolean (or very small)
challenges and responses when it comes to use Lemma 1.
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We adopt the multiparty setting from [10] and only adapt it to accommodate
public-key distance bounding. We consider a setting with participants which are
called either provers, veriers, or other actors. In public-key settings, we assume
only one verier V (other veriers can be taken as other actors). Similarly, we
often assume that provers correspond to the same identity so share the same
secret sk (provers with other secrets are considered as other actors). Other actors
are malicious by default. The dierence between malicious provers and malicious
actors is in the input: they receive sk or only pk.
We assume that participants run their algorithm only once. Multiple exe-
cutions are modeled by multiple instances which can be at dierent location or
time. We only assume that instances of honest provers never run concurrently. A
malicious prover may however clone himself at dierent locations and run many
algorithms concurrently.
Denition 3 (Experiment). Given a PoPoK (K;Kgen; P; V;B), we dene an
experiment exp by several participants who are a verier V, provers, and other
actors, and each instance of the participants. Instances who are within a distance
of at most B to V are said close-by. Instances who are within a distance larger
than B to V are called far-away. We say that the prover is always far-away if
all its instances are far away. We adopt a static adversarial model: either the
prover is honest, in which case all its instances run the P (sk) algorithm, or the
prover is malicious, in which case its instances can run any PPT algorithm.
If the prover is honest, its instances are assumed to be non-concurrent: at
each time, it must be dened which is the current instance. An instance of a
honest participant can only be active if it is the current one and if it has received
a special Activate message from a malicious participant. The rst current in-
stance must be dened in the experiment. Instances store an address of the next
current instance. This address can be updated by a special Destination message
from a malicious participant. It can also receive a special Halt message mak-
ing the algorithm terminate, and a special Move message. After receiving this
message and as soon as the algorithm terminated, the instance sends a special
Moving message to the instance specied in his destination address. Only current
instances can send this message to an instance of the same participant.2
At the beginning of the experiment, for malicious provers, (sk; pk) is set arbi-
trarily. If the provers are honest, sk 2 K is randomly selected and pk = Kgen(sk)
is computed. Then, sk is given as input to all prover instances, while pk is given
as input to all participants. V runs V (pk). All participants are then activated and
run concurrently. (If the prover is honest, only one is activated.) The experiment
terminates when V produces its nal output OutV .
We formalize security following [10].
Denition 4 (Honest Prover Security of PoPoK). We say that a PoPoK
(K;Kgen; P; V;B) is HP-secure if Pr[OutV = 1] = negl() for any experiment
with a single prover, where the prover is honest and always far-away from V.
2 All these special messages are dened in order to avoid participants moving faster
than messages and to allow arbitrary movements inuenced by the adversary.
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This denition clearly captures relay attacks, Maa fraud [15], man-in-the-
middle attacks in general, and even models (like in [6,8,9]) which distinguish
a learning phase (with provers which could be close-by) and an attack phase
(with far-away provers).
We now formalize the protection for the honest verier. Intuitively, we want
that if the proof is accepted, it must be because the information about the secret
sk is in the close-by neighborhood.
Denition 5 (Soundness of PoPoK). Given a function p(), we say that
a PoPoK (K;Kgen; P; V;B) is p()-sound if for any experiment exp in which
Pr[OutV = 1] > p(), there exists an algorithm E called extractor, with the
following property. exp denes an oracle which simulates an execution of exp
and returns the views of all participants which are close-by (excluding V) and
the transcript of the protocol seen by V. E can invoke the oracle many times.
Then, E nally outputs sk0 such that Kgen(sk0) = pk, using an expected time
complexity of Poly()Pr[OutV =1] p() .
This is trivial for experiments with a close-by prover as sk is in the view of
the prover. For experiments with no close-by participant at all, the transcript
as seen by V would leak. Otherwise, close-by actors would extract the prover's
credential. So, a far away malicious prover is bound to leak.
Compared to the soundness of interactive proofs, our notion uses a straight-
line extractor: we extract the secret from close-by participants without rewind-
ing them and after several independent executions. This makes the treatment
of multiparty settings much easier. As we will see, our extractor essentially uses
Lemma 1. Interestingly, the extractor is also used to prove HP-security: if the
protocol is zero-knowledge, the oracle extractor can be transformed into a stand-
alone extractor which contradicts the one-wayness of Kgen.
Clearly, our denition nicely connects the infamous terrorist-fraud resistance
to the soundness of interactive proofs. To compare with the literature, we could
see that terrorist frauds in our model make the secret leak instead of only making
man-in-the-middle attack feasible as in the notion of collusion fraud proposed in
[6,8,9], and on which the SKI protocol is based, or only making impersonation
attack feasible as in [10]. Our soundness is thus stronger.
Our notion and the one of [10] are close to soundness as dened in [25], except
that we no longer require 1=Pr[OutV = 1] to be polynomial. Also, compared to
[10], we no longer need the condition on the success of the experiment to extract
and we call an oracle O many times instead of using m views.
Just like other notions of TF-resistance, soundness is incomparable with
SimTF-security [16] or GameTF-security [18] in the DFKO model.
Denition 6 (Distance-fraud security). A PoPoK (K;Kgen; P; V;B) resists
to distance fraud if for any experiment exp where all participants are far away
from V, we have that Pr[OutV = 1] = negl().
We adapt the denition of distance-hijacking security from [26].
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Denition 7 (Resistance to Distance Hijacking [26]). We say that the
PoPoK (K;Kgen; P; V;B) is DH-secure if for all PPT algorithms K and A, the
following game makes V accept with negligible probability:
1: pick sk0 2 K, pk0 = Kgen(sk), K(pk0)! (sk; pk); if pk = pk0, the game aborts
2: let A run A(sk; pk; pk0), let V runs V (pk), let P 0, P 01; P 02; : : : run P (sk0)
3: let A interact with P 0; P 01; P 02 : : : and V concurrently until the initialization
phase ends for V
4: let P 0 and V continue interacting with each other until the challenge phase
ends for V; A receives the exchanged messages but remains passive
5: let A continue interacting with P 0; P 01; P 02 : : : and V concurrently during the
verication phase
3 ProProx: a PoPoK Scheme
3.1 Building Blocks
Perfectly binding bit commitment. Depending on the security parameter , we
use a (multiplicative) group structure with two Abelian groups L and G and
an element  such that G is generated by L and ,  62 L, and L is the set of
all squares of G. We further assume that it is easy to do group operations and
comparisons in G and to sample elements in G uniformly.3 Finally, we assume
it is computationally hard to distinguish elements from L and from G.
We dene Com(b; ) = b2 for a bit b and a random  2 G, like in the
Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem [20,21]. So, Com is computationally hiding as
dened by Def. 8. We will not require any secret key to extract b, although there
exists a function Com 1 such that Com 1(Com(b; )) = b for all b 2 f0; 1g and
 2 G. We will rather use the homomorphic properties of the commitment and
prove the correct commitment in a zero-knowledge way.
Denition 8 (Bit commitment). A bit commitment consists of a PPT al-
gorithm Com taking as input , a bit b 2 Z2, and some random  2 G. It
computes Com(b; ) 2 G. We dene the following properties: 1. homomorphic:
for all b; b0 2 Z2 and ; 0 2 G, Com(b; )Com(b0; 0) = Com(b + b0; 0); 2. per-
fectly binding: for all b; b0 2 Z2 and ; 0 2 G, Com(b; ) = Com(b0; 0) implies
b = b0; 3. computationally hiding: for  random, the distributions of Com(0; )
and Com(1; ) are computationally indistinguishable.
For instance, we can take a Blum integer N , i.e., N = PQ for two distinct
primes P and Q which are congruent to 3 modulo 4. We set L to the set of
quadratic residues modulo N and  =  1: a residue modulo N such that   P  =

Q

=  1. The algorithm Com is given N and . We sample r 2 G by r =
b2 mod N , for b 2 Z2 and  2 ZN . Distinguishing G from L is the (supposedly
hard) quadratic residuosity problem. In this case, N is assumed to come from a
Common Reference String (CRS).
3 So, we can sample an element of L uniformly by taking r2 with r uniform in G.
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A zero-knowledge proof for z being a square. We use the Fiat-Shamir proto-
col [17]. Namely, we show that z is a commitment to zero with a witness  (i.e.,
z = 2) with the protocol from Fig. 1, based on a perfectly hiding trapdoor
commitment. Concretely, we use Def. 9 and Def. 10 with the NP language L of
all squares. If z = 2, we say that z is a member of L with witness .
Verier Prover
public: z z = 2 secret: 
pk               generate sk, pk = Gen(sk)
pick e 2 Z2, pick r
Commitpk(e;r)             !
h               pick g 2 G, h = g2
e;r             ! open commitment
check ze = `2h 1, pk = Gen(sk)
`;sk               ` = ge
OutV             !
Fig. 1. ZKP(z : ): a Sound and Zero-Knowledge Proof for z Being a Square.
Denition 9 (Sound proof of membership). An interactive proof for a lan-
guage L is a pair (P (); V (z)) of PPT algorithms such that 1. completeness: for
any z 2 L with witness , Pr [OutV = 1 : P ()$ V (z)] = 1; 2. -soundness: for
any z 62 L and any algorithm P  then Pr [OutV = 1 : P  $ V (z)]  .
Denition 10 (Zero-knowledge protocol). A protocol (P (); V (z)) for a
language L is computationally zero-knowledge for P () if for any PPT interac-
tive machine V (z; aux) there exists a PPT algorithm S(z; aux) and a negligible
" such that for any PPT distinguisher, any (z : ) 2 L, and any aux, the advan-
tage for distinguishing the nal view of V (z; aux) in P ()$ V (z; aux) and the
output of S(z; aux) is bounded by ".
The protocol of Fig. 1 is 12 -sound and zero-knowledge. It must be run k times
in parallel to achieve a soundness level  = 2 k. We denote it by ZKP(z : ).
By using parallel composition, we extend the protocol to prove that z1; : : : ; zk
are some commitments to zero with witness 1; : : : ; k respectively, and denote
it by ZKP(z1; : : : ; zk : 1; : : : ; k). I.e., it succeeds with probability up to  if
there exists i such that zi 62 L.
(Perfectly binding) deterministic commitment. Given a hash function H making
coins for Com, we dene a deterministic commitment by
ComH(sk) = (Com(sk1;H(sk; 1)); : : : ;Com(sks;H(sk; s)))
for sk 2 Zs2. We assume that ComH is a one-way function (as dened by Def. 11).
We assume the existence of Com and H such that ComH is one-way as indepen-
dent primitives. This is the case in particular when H is a random oracle, but H
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is not necessarily assumed to be a random oracle. Constructions without using
a random oracle are left to future work.
Denition 11 (One-way function). We consider a function Com taking as
input  and a message sk 2 Zs2 which is computable in deterministic polynomial
time. The function is one-way if for any algorithm receiving Com(sk), for sk 2 Zs2
random, the probability that it outputs sk is negligible.
3.2 The ProProx Protocol
We dene the ProProx protocol, as depicted on Fig. 2 (there, double arrows
indicate messages which can be subject to noise). We consider s (the size of
the secret), n (the number of rounds per iteration),  (the minimal number of
correct rounds per iteration for acceptance) as functions in terms of the security
parameter . We assume s and n are asymptotically linear. We use a matrix
b 2 Zsn2 . The use of b will only appear in Theorem 18 to treat distance fraud.
There, we will consider two variants.
Variant I: b is constant and the columns must have a Hamming weight of

n
2

to make sure that bi;j + xj 6= 0 in half of the rounds. This requires n  2.
Variant II: b is randomly selected by V and sent to P during the initialization
phase. This requires n  1.
Verier Prover
public: pk pk = ComH(sk) secret: sk
initialization phase
for i = 1 to n and j = 1 to s
pick ai;j 2 Z2, i;j
Ai;j                     Ai;j = Com(ai;j ; i;j)
challenge phase
for i = 1 to n and j = 1 to s
pick ci;j 2 Z2
start timeri;j
ci;j
====================) receive c0i;j
receive ri;j , stop timeri;j
r0i;j(==================== r0i;j = ai;j + c0i;jbi;j + c0i;jskj
verication phase
check #Ij =  , timeri;j  2B agree on I1;:::;Is                   !
for i 2 Ij , j = 1; : : : ; s
zi;j = Ai;j

bi;j pkj
ci;j
 ri;j
ZKP(zi;j :i;j ;i2Ij ;j=1;:::;s)                      ! i;j = i;jH(sk; j)c
0
i;j
OutV                   !
Fig. 2. ProProx: a Sound and Secure PoPoK.
The prover holds a secret sk 2 Zs2 and the public key is pk = ComH(sk). We
iterate s times and in parallel a protocol which we call an iteration and which
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corresponds to an index j. First, the prover selects n bits a1;j ; : : : ; an;j 2 Z2 and
commits to them using some fresh coins 1;j ; : : : ; n;j , respectively. So, Ai;j =
Com(ai;j ; i;j), i = 1; : : : ; n. The Ai;j 's are sent to the verier.
In the challenge phase, we have n time-critical rounds (in each iteration).
These rounds may be subject to noise. The verier picks a challenge ci;j 2 Z2
at random and sends it to the prover. The prover receives c0i;j (which may be
dierent, due to noise). He computes his response r0i;j = ai;j + c
0
i;jbi;j + c
0
i;jskj
and sends it back to the verier at once. The verier receives ri;j . The verier
measures the elapsed time timeri;j taken to receive ri;j after ci;j was sent. Below,
pnoise is the probability that some noise corrupts a challenge/response round. We
assume that the noise corrupts each round independently.
Thus, the c0i;j 7! r0i;j function maps one bit to one bit.
In the verication phase, the prover and the verier determine a set Ij of 
round indices which they believe are correct. The way this agreement is done is
not important (as long as the prover does not leak). Then, the verier checks
whether Ij has cardinality  and the corresponding timers are small enough. If
this fails, the verier rejects. As a concrete instance for Ij agreement, we suggest
that the prover sends (through the lazy noiseless channel) the c0i;j and r
0
i;j to the
verier. The verier then takes the rst  rounds for which ci;j = c
0
i;j , ri;j = r
0
i;j ,
and timeri;j  2B to dene Ij and sends Ij to the prover. If there are not enough
correct rounds, the protocol aborts.
Next, the prover and the verier run the interactive proof ZKP to show that
the responses ri;j 's are consistent with the Ai;j 's and pkj 's. Namely, for all j and
i 2 Ij , they compute
zi;j = Ai;j
 
bi;jpkj
ci;j
 ri;j ; i;j = i;jH(sk; j)c
0
i;j
Since Ai;j = 
ai;j2i;j and pkj = 
skjH(sk; j)2, it is easy to verify that ri;j =
ai;j + ci;jbi;j + ci;jskj is equivalent to the existence of i;j such that zi;j = 
2
i;j .
That is, zi;j 2 L. If this fails, the protocol aborts. When the protocol aborts, the
verier sends OutV = 0. Otherwise, he sends OutV = 1.
3.3 Analysis
Theorem 12 (Completeness). Let " > 0 be a constant. We assume either
that n = 
() and n < 1   pnoise   " or that pnoise = 0. We assume that Com
is a homomorphic bit commitment [Def. 8] and that ZKP is complete [Def. 9].
The ProProx protocol is a PoPoK which fails with probability bounded by
pComp = 1  Tail (n; ; 1  pnoise)s (1)
when the challenge/response rounds are subject to a noise level of pnoise [Def. 2].
Proof. Completeness for pnoise = 0 is trivial. Proving completeness when

n <
1   pnoise   " is straightforward: in an iteration, we have less than  noiseless
rounds with probability 1   Tail(n; ; 1   pnoise) < e 2"2n due to the Cherno-
Hoeding bound (Lemma 13), which is negligible since n = 
(). Then, the
completeness failure is bounded by pComp which is also negligible. ut
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We recall here some useful bound on the tail of the binomial distribution.
Lemma 13 (Cherno-Hoeding bound [13,23]). For any "; n; ; q we have

n < q  " =) Tail(n; ; q) > 1  e 2"
2n and n > q+ " =) Tail(n; ; q) < e 2"
2n.
We construct an extractor giving an output which is close to the secret.
Lemma 14 (Straightline extractor). Under the assumption that Com is a
perfectly binding homomorphic bit commitment, and that ZKP is a -sound
proof of membership, for any experiment, there is a PPT algorithm Extract which
takes the views of all close-by participants and the transcript of the protocol seen
by V and which aborts if V rejects, otherwise produces a vector sk0 2 f0; 1gs. For
any w, the probability that V accepts and the Hamming distance between sk and
sk0 is at least w + 1 is lower than
pSound = Tail
ln
2
m
;   
jn
2
k
;
1
2
w+1
+  (2)
We will often dene pB = Tail(dn2 e;    bn2 c; 12 ). We note that if we assume that
s = 
() and   n  ( 12  2")dn2 e with a constant ", we have
 n+dn2 e
dn2 e 
1
2 +2".
So, pB  e 8"2n due to the Cherno-Hoeding bound (Lemmma 13), which is
negligible. This case will be use subsequently.
Proof. We assume that we have an experiment making V accept with probability
p. We dene pB = Tail(dn2 e;    bn2 c; 12 ).
We take the viewpoint of V. Since we have a perfectly binding commitment,
the value pkj uniquely denes skj = Com
 1(pkj), and the value of Ai;j uniquely
denes ai;j = Com
 1(Ai;j). (We stress that we need not compute these values,
we just mathematically dene them given the view of the verier.) The purpose
of the proof is to show that we can extract a good approximation of sk (i.e., at
a distance lower than w), except with some negligible probability pSound.
Let p = Pr[OutV = 1]. Let S be the event that for all j and for at least 
values of i (for each j), we have ri;j = ai;j + ci;j(bi;j + skj) (where the values are
those seen by V). In the case where the statement proven by ZKP is true, for
all j and i 2 Ij , zi;j is clearly a commitment to zero. Due to the homomorphic
property of Com, we know that zi;j is the commitment to ai;j+ci;j(bi;j+skj) ri;j .
So, we deduce that S occurs. By using the -soundness of ZKP (Def. 9), we
deduce Pr[OutV = 1j:S]  . So, Pr[:S;OutV = 1]  .
Since the ci;j challenges are sent in sequence, in what follows we denote by
cq = ciq;jq the qth challenge sent. We further denote by  all random coins of the
experiment except those dening the challenges. So, we compute probabilities
over the independent distributions of  and all ci;j .
Thanks to Lemma 1, we can write ri;j = Algoi;j (ci;j ;Datai;j) with Datai;j =
(Views; Incomingi;j ;Outgoingi;j), where Views lists the initial view of close-by
participants, Incomingi;j gives the list of incoming messages from far away that
they can see until the sender can see ci;j , and Outgoingi;j includes the list
of outgoing messages from V before ci;j . Note that Datai;j can be computed
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from the nal views of the close-by participants but depends on the selected
challenges before ci;j . So, thanks to Lemma 1, we can compute in this case
both respi;j(0) = Algoi;j(0;Datai;j) and respi;j(1) = Algoi;j(1;Datai;j) with-
out rewinding (i.e., from the nal view only). Since ri;j is supposed to be
ai;j + ci;j(bi;j + skj), we can compute the guess i;j = respi;j(1)  respi;j(0)  bi;j
for skj . (Note that if the answer ri;j comes to V from far-away, we can still apply
Lemma 1 and deduce that the answer is the same for ci;j = 0 and ci;j = 1, so
i;j =  bi;j .) In all cases, we can always compute the vectors j = (1;j ; : : : ; n;j)
of guesses for skj . The extractor is taking all Algoi;j(:;Datai;j) to compute j
then sk0j = majority(j) for all j.
Given c, if ai;j + c(bi;j + skj) = respi;j(c), we say that the answer to ci;j = c
is correct relative to the previous challenges (we recall that Datai;j depends on
all challenges which are sent before ci;j). Based on , we construct a binary tree
T of depth ns in which a node at depth q corresponds to the selection of cq. We
denote by G(cjc1; : : : ; cq 1) the predicate that c is correct relative to c1; : : : ; cq 1.
Let S
c1;:::;cq
T be an s-tuple of integers such that (S
c1;:::;cq
T )j = #fq0  q; jq0 =
j;G(cq0 jc1; : : : ; cq0 1)g. This counts how many good answers we had until step q
for the c:;j challenges which are based on skj . We let S denote the event that
(SC1;:::;CnsT )j   for all j where C1; : : : ; Cns are the random challenges from the
experiment. V only accepts when S holds. Let Rc1;:::;cqT be an s-tuple of integers
such that (R
c1;:::;cq
T )j = #fq0  q; jq0 = j;G(0jc1; : : : ; cq0 1); G(1jc1; : : : ; cq0 1)g.
This counts how many times both values lead to good answers for the c:;j chal-
lenges. If G(0jc1; : : : ; cq0 1) and G(1jc1; : : : ; cq0 1) hold, then iq;jq = skj . So,
if (R
c1;:::;cns 1
T )j  bn2 c + 1, we have sk0j = skj . We let W be the number of
j such that (RC1;:::;CnsT )j  bn2 c. We show below that for all , Pr[S;W >
w]  pSound    over the distribution of the ci;j . By averaging over , we have
Pr[S;W > w]  pSound   . Thus, by splitting with the S and :S events,
Pr[W > w;OutV = 1]  Pr[:S;OutV = 1] + Pr[S;W > w]  pSound
So, having that V accepts and the extractor gives at least w + 1 errors occurs
with probability bounded by pSound, which is what we wanted to prove.
To show that Pr[S;W > w]  pSound  in the xed tree T , we rst modify
the tree in a way which only make this probability increase. Namely, we add
more G(cqjc1; : : : ; cq 1) so that for all j, (Rc1;:::;cnsT )j is either n or

n
2

. Then,
we show a more general property. We consider a balanced binary tree of depth
q with some indexing q $ (iq; jq). We denote qj the number of k 2 f1; : : : ; qg
such that jk = j. So, q = q1 +   + qs. We let WT (J;w) be the event that for at
least w + 1 values of j 2 J we have (Rc1;:::;cqT )j  qj  

n
2

, for other values of j
we have (R
c1;:::;cq
T )j = qj , and for all j 2 J we have (SC1;:::;CqT )j     (n  qj).
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We show that for all J , j 's, and j 's, we have
Pr
24WT (J;w); ^
j 62J
(S
C1;:::;Cq
T )j  j ; (RC1;:::;CqT )j  j
35
 pw+1B 
Y
j 62J
tail

qj   j ; j   j ; 1
2

(3)
Then, we apply it with J = f1; : : : ; sg. We obtain Pr[S;W > w]  pw+1B =
pSound   .
The (3) property is proven by induction on q. It is trivial for q = 0. Assuming
it holds for q   1, we prove it for q by looking at the two subtrees T0 and T1 of
T . We have
(S
c1;:::;cq
T )j=(S
c2;:::;cq
Tc1
)j (R
c1;:::;cq
T )j=(R
c2;:::;cq
Tc1
)j if j 6= j1
(S
c1;:::;cq
T )j=(S
c2;:::;cq
Tc1
)j + 1G(c1) (R
c1;:::;cq
T )j=(R
c2;:::;cq
Tc1
)j + 1G(0);G(1) if j = j1
If j1 62 J or G(0)^G(1) holds,WT (J;w) is equivalent toWTC1 (J 0; w0) for J 0 = J
and w0 = w. If now j1 2 J and :G(0)_:G(1) holds, we dene j1 =  (n qj1),
j1 = qj1  

n
2

, J 0 = J   fj1g, and w0 = w   1. Then, WT (J;w) is equivalent
to, (S
C1;:::;Cq
T )j1  j1 , (Rc1;:::;cqT )j1 = j1 , and WTC1 (J 0; w0). So,
Pr
24WT (J;w); ^
j 62J
(S
C1;:::;Cq
T )j  j ; (RC1;:::;CqT )j  j
35
=
1X
c1=0
Pr
24WT (J;w); ^
j 62J
(S
c1;C2;:::;Cq
T )j  j ; (Rc1;C2;:::;CqT )j  j ; C1 = c1
35

1X
c1=0
Pr
24WTc1 (J 0; w0); ^
j 62J 0
(S
c1;C2;:::;Cq
T )j  j ; (Rc1;C2;:::;CqT )j  j ; C1 = c1
35
=
1X
c1=0
1
2
Pr
h
WTc1
(J0;w0);V
j 62J0 (S
C2;:::;Cq
Tc1
)jj 1j=j1;G(c1);(R
C2;:::;Cq
Tc1
)jj 1j=j1;G(0);G(1)
i

1X
c1=0
1
2
pw
0+1
B
Y
j 62J 0
tail
 
qj 1j=j1 j+1j=j1;G(0);G(1);j 1j=j1;G(c1) j+1j=j1;G(0);G(1);
1
2

When j1 2 J 0, this proves (3). For j1 62 J 0, we obtain
pw
0+1
B
 
1X
c1=0
1
2
tail

qj1   1  j1 + 1G(0);G(1); j1   1G(c1)   j1 + 1G(0);G(1);
1
2
!

Y
j 62J0
j 6=j1
tail

qj   j ; j   j ; 1
2

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If both G(0) and G(1) are true the sum in parentheses is clearly equal to tail(qj1 
j1 ; j1   j1 ; 12 ). If either G(0) or G(1) is true but not both, the sum is
1
2
tail

qj1   1  j1 ; j1   j1 ;
1
2

+
1
2
tail

qj1   1  j1 ; j1   1  j1 ;
1
2

which is also equal to tail(qj1 j1 ; j1 j1 ; 12 ). Finally, if neither G(0) nor G(1)
hold, the sum is tail(qj1   1   j1 ; j1   j1 ; 12 ) which is bounded by tail(qj1  
j1 ; j1   j1 ; 12 ). So, in all cases this proves (3). ut
Theorem 15 (Soundness). We assume that Com is a perfectly binding ho-
momorphic bit commitment, and that ZKP is a -sound proof of membership.
ProProx is a pSound-sound proof of proximity, where pSound is dened by (2).
More precisely, for all constant w, if the experiment succeeds with probability
p > pSound there exists an extractor following Def. 5 with complexity
Texp:O

1
p  pSound

+ TComH :O (Bsw)
where Texp is the complexity of the experiment, TComH is the complexity to com-
pute ComH , and B
s
w =
Pw
i=0
 
s
i

. The second term is actually the complexity of
an exhaustive search with Bsw iterations on sk until pk = ComH(sk).
To use (2) with concrete parameters, w is chosen as the maximal value such that
an adversary could aord an exhaustive search of Bsw trials.
Proof. We can use the extractor of Lemma 14 on views taken from an experiment
run. If V rejects, the extraction produces nothing. We iterate this extraction
O( 1p ) times until one experiment succeeds. So, we obtain for sure a guess sk0
for sk (with possible errors). The probability that at least w errors occurs in
the extracted pairs is bounded by pSoundp . When there are less errors, we can
correct them by exhaustive search in time TComH :O(Bsw) (which is polynomial).
If this fails (i.e., if it gives no preimage of pk by ComH) as some extracted pairs
may have too many errors, we can just iterate. With a number of iterations of
O

1  pSoundp
 1
, we nally extract sk. The overall expected complexity is
thus Poly()=(p pSound). More precisely, it is Texp:O

1
p pSound

+TComH :O (Bsw).
ut
Our technique to prove HP-security relies on Lemma 14 and zero-knowledge.
Lemma 16 (Zero-knowledge). Under the assumption that Com is a com-
putationally hiding bit commitment and that ZKP is a computationally zero-
knowledge proof of membership, The ProProx protocol is zero-knowledge follow-
ing Def. 10. More precisely, for any malicious verier, given a simulator for
ZKP of complexity TSim producing views which are pZKP-indistinguishable to the
real ones, we construct a simulator for ProProx of complexity TSim + ns:TCom
and producing views which are pZK-indistinguishable to the real ones, where
pZK = pZKP + ns:pCom (4)
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where pCom is the bound on the hiding property of Com.
Proof. We have to prove that, given two participants P (sk) and V (pk; aux),
there exists a simulator S(pk; aux) such that V (pk; aux) $ P (sk) produces a
view of V (pk; aux) which is computationally indistinguishable from the output
of S(pk; aux). We actually construct a sequence of simulations. We dene an
interactive V 0(pk; aux) to replace V (pk; aux), and some interactive P 0(sk) and
P 00 to replace P (sk).
We denote z the vector of all zi;j for j = 1; : : : ; s and i 2 Ij , and  the vector
of all i;j . We split V
(pk; aux) into two protocols V1(pk; aux) and V2(z; aux0),
where V1 mimics V
 until the ZKP(z : ) protocol must start. V2 executes
only ZKP(z : ) where aux
0 is the nal view of V1(pk; aux). The nal view of
V2(z; aux
0) is of form v = (z; aux0; t). We write g(v) = (aux0; t), which is the nal
view of V (pk; aux). Similarly, we split P (sk) into P1(sk) and P2(sk; u) where
(sk; u) is the view of P1(sk). Running either V
(pk; aux)$ P (sk) and taking the
nal view of V , or V1(pk; aux) $ P1(sk), V2(z; aux0) $ P2(sk; u), then taking
g(v) is the same. This simulation is illustrated on the left-hand side of Fig. 3.
V (pk; aux)
V1(pk; aux)
?aux
0
V2(z; aux
0)
?
(aux0; t)
-
-
P (sk)
P1(sk)
?
P2(sk; u)
V 0(pk; aux)
V1(pk; aux)
?aux
0
S0(z; aux0)
?
g(v0)
- P1(sk)
?6ai;j Ai;j
Com(ai;j ; i;j)
S(pk; aux)
V1(pk; aux)
?aux
0
S0(z; aux0)
?
g(v0)
- P 00
Fig. 3. Applying a ZK Reduction.
First, V 0(pk; aux) runs a simulation of V1(pk; aux) interacting with P1(sk).
Then, V 0(pk; aux) runs the simulator S0(z; aux0) of the ZKP(z : ) protocol
associated to the verier V2(z; aux
0) with complexity TSim. Let v0 be the output
of S0(z; aux0). Finally, V 0(pk; aux) produces g(v0) as an output. This simulation
is illustrated on the middle of Fig. 3. Due to the zero-knowledge property of
ZKP(z : ), v
0 is pZKP-indistinguishable from the nal view of V2(z; aux0). So, the
nal view of V 0(pk; aux) in V 0(pk; aux)$ P1(sk) and the nal view of V (pk; aux)
in V (pk; aux)$ P (sk) are pZKP-indistinguishable.
Note that P1(sk) makes no longer extra use of the coins i's (as P2(sk; u) does
in ZKP). So, the commitment can be outsourced to a challenger playing the
real-or-random hiding game for Com. We modify P1(sk) into an algorithm P
0(sk)
who sets Ai;j to the commitment to some random bit instead of ai;j . Thanks to
the hiding property of Com applied ns times, the output of V 0(pk; aux)$ P1(sk)
and of V 0(pk; aux)$ P 0(sk) are ns:pCom-indistinguishable.
Finally, r0i in P
0(sk) is now uniformly distributed and independent from all the
rest, so we change P 0(sk) into an algorithm P 00 which sends a random r0i instead.
Note that P 00 no longer needs sk. So, the view of V  in V (pk; aux)$ P (sk) and
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the output of V 0(pk; aux) $ P 00 are indistinguishable. This denes a simulator
S(pk; aux), as illustrated on the right-hand-side of Fig. 3. ut
Theorem 17 (HP-Security). We assume that Com is a perfectly binding, and
computationally hiding homomorphic bit commitment, that ComH is one-way,
and that ZKP is a -sound computationally zero-knowledge proof of membership
for  = negl(). For all w, we take an experiment with r instances of the honest
prover and we split it into r successive experiments, with one honest prover per
splitted experiment. Each of them is associated to a simulator Simi for the ZKP
protocol and we denote by TSimi the complexity of the simulator. Assuming that
the experiment succeeds with probability at least
pSec = pSound + r:pZK + pCom (5)
(where pSound is dened by (2)) we construct an inversion algorithm for ComH
with complexity
rX
i=1
TSimi + TComH :O (Bsw) + rns:TCom
where pZK, pCom, and TCom are dened as in Lemma 16, TComH is the complexity
of ComH , and B
s
w is dened in Th. 15. For s = 
() and that   n ( 12 2")dn2 e
with a constant ", pSec is negligible. So, ProProx is HP-secure.
Proof. We consider an experiment exp with an honest always far-away prover.
Let p be the probability that V accepts. We want to show that p = negl().
We dene pB = Tail(dn2 e;    bn2 c; 12 ). We use Lemma 14 to extract the
vector sk0 when V accepts, with at least w errors to sk with probability bounded
by pSound. Then, by a TComH :O(Bsw)-time exhaustive search on the errors, we
correct sk0 and check if we obtain a preimage of ComH like in Th. 15. This
gives sk in polynomial time and a probability of success of at least p   pSound,
by playing with some non-concurrent instances of P (sk). For each of the non-
concurrent instances of P (sk), we then use the ZK property of P (sk) to construct
an algorithm inverting ComH with probability of success of at least p  pSound  
r:pZK, where r is the number of P (sk) instances in one experiment. By assumption
on ComH , this must be bounded by some negligible pCom. So, we have p  pSec
with pSec dened by Eq. (5). The values , pZK, and pCom are negligible, while r
is polynomial and w is constant. So, pSound and pSec are negligible. ut
Note that a malicious prover can run a distance fraud in each round such
that bi;j = skj , as ri;j no longer depends on ci;j . For sk = 0 (as allowed in the
malicious prover model) and b = 0, this can be done in all rounds, so we can
have a distance fraud. There is no contradiction with soundness: an observer
seeing that the verier accepts can deduce that skj is likely to be zero, for all j.
So, the malicious prover leaks.
To have distance fraud resistance, we adopt a trick from DB2 [10]: we select
a vector bj with Hamming weight

n
2

so that half of the rounds will really use
ci;j . Actually, bj has a maximal distance to the repetition code.
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Theorem 18 (DF-Resistance). We assume that Com is a perfectly binding
bit commitment and that ZKP is a -sound proof of membership for  = negl().
Every distance fraud in ProProx succeeds with a probability bounded by
pDF =

+ Tail
 
n
2

;    n2  ; 12s in variant I
+
 
3
4
ns
in variant II
(6)
For n = 
() and   n  ( 12   2")bn2 c with a constant ", pDF is negligible. So,
ProProx is DF-resistant.
Proof. We concentrate on the jth iteration. Let wj be the weight of the vector
bj  (skj ; : : : ; skj). Due to the perfectly binding property, the view of V uniquely
denes skj and ai;j . Thanks to Lemma 1, ri;j is obtained from IncomingV(Far), so
independent from ci;j . So, for bi;j 6= skj (which happens for wj rounds), we have
that Pr[ri;j = ai;j + ci;jbi;j + ci;jskj ] =
1
2 . So, the probability that the statement
in ZKP holds is bounded by
Qs
j=1 Tail(wj ;   n+wj ; 12 ) which is negligible for
 n+wj
wj
 12 + 2", due to the Cherno-Hoeding bound (Lemma 13) for n =

(). Due to the fact that ZKP is sound, the verier accepts with probability
bounded by +Tail(bn2 c;    dn2 e; 12 )s in the rst variant of the protocol. In the
second variant, we rst note that E(Tail(wj ;    n+ wj ; 12 )) = E(2 wj ) =
 
3
4
n
since n =  . So, the verier accepts with probability bounded by +
 
3
4
ns
. ut
We also treat distance hijacking [14] specically.
Theorem 19 (DH-Resistance). We assume that Com is a perfectly binding
bit commitment, that ComH is one-way, and that ZKP is a -sound proof of
membership for  = negl(). For any constant w, given a DH attack succeeding
with probability at least
pDH =
(
+ Tail
 
n; ; 12
w
in variant I
+
 
1
2
wdn2 e in variant II (7)
we can construct an inversion algorithm for ComH with complexity TComH :O (sw)
where TComH is the complexity of ComH . For n = 
() and   n  ( 12   2")dn2 e
with a constant ", pDH is negligible. So, ProProx is DH-resistant.
Proof. We consider a DH attack with a malicious prover P  = P (sk) with a
public key pk and an honest prover P 0 = P (sk0) with a public key pk0. During the
initialization, P 0 chooses some a0i;j bits which are committed in some A
0
i;j . He also
receives some b0i;j bits while V has some bi;j bits. The malicious prover P
 sends
some Ai;j to V and we denote ai;j = Com
 1(Ai;j). During the challenge phase,
V and P 0 interact in a noisy channel. We write r0i;j = ei;j + a
0
i;j + ci;j(b
0
i;j + sk
0
i)
the response by P 0, where Pr[ei;j = 1] = pnoise and all ei;j are independent.
As the verier expects ri;j = ai;j + ci;j(bi;j + skj), this holds if and only if
ai;j + a
0
i;j + ei;j = ci;j(bi;j + b
0
i;j + skj + sk
0
j). This can only hold with probability
1
2 when the content of the parenthesis is equal to 1.
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Let wj be the number of i such that bi;j + b
0
i;j 6= skj + sk0j . Clearly, the jth
iteration has  correct responses with probability bounded by Tail(wj ;    n +
wj ;
1
2 ). If wj  dn2 e, this is bounded by Tail(dn2 e;    bn2 c; 12 ). Otherwise, the
probability is bounded by 1, but the majority of bi;j + b
0
i;j matches skj + sk
0
j so
the adversary deduces sk0j . Let w be the number of j such that wj  dn2 e. Clearly,
the responses are overall acceptable with a probability bounded by Tail(dn2 e;   bn2 c; 12 )w. Due to the soundness of ZKP, the probability of success is bounded
by  + Tail(dn2 e;    bn2 c; 12 )w. Furthermore, by the majority decoding, we have
an inversion algorithm for ComH with complexity O (sw:TComH ).
We note that when b is xed in the protocol, wj is equal to either 0 or n.
So, in the rst variant of the protocol, the same analysis as above concludes to
a probability of success bounded by +Tail(n; ; 12 )
w. In the second variant, we
have n =  and the probability simplies to 2 wdn2 e. ut
3.4 Simplication in the Noiseless Communications Case
The protocol could be simplied in noiseless environment. For this, we would
take n =  . There is clearly no need to agree on Ij which is always the full set
Ij = f1; : : : ; ng. The protocol is much simpler. Variant I and Variant II use in (6)
the bounds
 
1
2
bn2 cs and   34ns, respectively. For n even, the Variant I is better,
but if we want to lower n down to n = 1, we must use Variant II.
3.5 Concrete Parameters
To see if the proven bounds Eq. (2), Eq. (5), Eq. (6), and Eq. (7) are tight
or not, we look at the best known attacks. They correspond to the following
probabilities of success:
pIDF = Tail
jn
2
k
;   
ln
2
m
;
1
2
s
pIIDF =

3
4
ns
pSec = pDH = Tail

n; ;
1
2
s
pSound = Tail
ln
2
m
;   
jn
2
k
;
1
2
s
where pDF depends on Variant I or Variant II. The DF attack with success
probability pDF consists of guessing ci in half of the rounds for which bi;j 6= skj .
So, the proven bound Eq. (6) is pretty tight.
The MF attack with success probability pSec follows the post-ask strategy:
the adversary rst guesses the answers to all challenges then plays with the
prover with the same challenges. Clearly, there is a gap between pSec and the
proven bound of Eq. (5). The DH case is similar: the malicious prover commits
to some random ai;j which will make the correspondence between ci;j and ri;j
between P 0 correct for P with probability 12 .
The TF attack with success probability pSound consists of giving a table of all
c0i;j 7! r0i;j which is corrupted in half of the rounds (selected at random) in each
iteration, so that it gives no information about skj . Having the table c
0
i;j 7! r0i;j
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corrupted means that one of the two entries (selected at random) is ipped.
There is also a gap with the proven bound Eq. (2).
So, it may be the case that either the bounds Eq. (2), Eq. (5), and Eq. (7)
can be improved, or that there exist better attacks. To select the parameters,
we could either use the proven bounds or the above equations based on the best
known attacks that we call the empirical bounds.
As concrete parameters, we could suggest  = 80 bits as the security parame-
ter and a modulus N of 1 024 bits. Then, we look for n and  which minimize the
total number of rounds n while keeping pComp  1 2 7 and dierent objectives:
we propose several vectors of parameters to reach the online security of either
 = 2 20 (high) or  = 2 10 (low), with proven bounds or empirical bound,
and with either pnoise = 1% or the noiseless variant (pnoise = 0) from Section 3.4.
In the computation of Eq. (2) and Eq. (5), we took  = 4 and w such that the
exhaustive search is not more for a random s-bit string, i.e., Bsw  2. For that,
we took s = + 1 and w = d s2e.
The total number of rounds is ns.
security bounds pnoise ns s n w  Variant pComp pDF pSec pSound pDH
high proven 1% 648 81 8 41 6 I 1  2 8 2 22 2 21 2 21 2 22
high empirical 1% 640 80 8 { 6 I 1  2 8 2 43 2 223 2 43 2 223
low proven 1% 567 81 7 41 5 I 1  2 9 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12
low empirical 1% 560 80 7 { 5 I 1  2 9 2 15 2 171 2 43 2 171
high proven 0 162 81 2 41 2 I 1 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22
high empirical 0 160 80 2 { 2 I 1 2 80 2 160 2 80 2 160
low proven 0 162 81 2 41 2 I 1 2 12 2 12 2 12 2 12
low empirical 0 160 80 2 { 2 I 1 2 80 2 160 2 80 2 160
high proven 0 81 81 1 41 1 II 1 2 22 2 22 2 22 2 22
high empirical 0 80 80 1 { 1 II 1 2 33 2 80 2 80 2 80
Clearly, there is a big gap between proven and empirical parameters in the
high security values. We can observe that the noise has a huge impact on the
complexity. Sometimes, the obtained parameters with low and high security are
the same. This comes from pSec and pSound being basically equal to . As we can
see, the noiseless case with n = 1 and s = 80 oers pretty ecient parameters.
For other parameters, ns may look high. However, we shall keep in mind that
distance bounding rounds are exchanging bits very quickly. A challenge/response
round shall take much less than 100ns. So, even by \wasting" 10s in between
rounds, ns = 648 takes less than 7ms. So, the round-complexity is not so
important. What matters more is the impact on other cryptographic opera-
tions. Indeed, the prover needs to compute ns commitments, so 32ns multipli-
cations, and  s log2  parallel rounds of ZKP, so  32s log2  multiplications.
So, 32 (n   log2 )s multiplications in total. Hence, we shall consider the regular
tricks to perform batch ZKP proofs to reduce the complexity.
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4 Conclusion
We proposed ProProx, the very rst PoPoK addressing soundness. It is provably
secure. A remaining challenge is to construct a more ecient PoPoK. Another
open question would be to have a tight security proof for ProProx.
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